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METROPOLITAN COUNCIL OF NAACP BRANCHES V. FCC:
ISOLATED INSTANCE OR DE FACTO ELIMINATION
OF THE CROSS-OWNERSHIP BAN?
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1975, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or
the Commission) promulgated its Second Report and Order' con-
cluding a seven year administrative process in which it considered
cross-ownership of media outlets.2 This regulation prohibits the
owner of a television station from owning or purchasing in the fu-
ture a daily newspaper with distribution covering the same market
area.3 The Second Report and Order further provides that, "if a
broadcast station licensee were to purchase one or more daily news-
papers in the same market, it would be required to dispose of any
broadcast stations that it owned in that market within one year or
by the time of its next renewal date, whichever is longer."4 The
regulation also required divestiture of media outlets in some ex-
isting cases. 5
Under the Broadcasting Act of 1934, the Commission is given
authority to act so long as it finds that its actions serve the "public
1. 50 F.C.C.2d 1046 (1975) (codified in 47 C.F.R §§ 73.35, 73.240, 73.636
(1976)).
2. Karen A. Hoffman, Note, Newspaper-Broadcast Cross Ownership Policy: A New
Standard From Across the Border, 23 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 333, 333 (1991). The
administrative process began in 1968 when the FCC gave notice of a rule propos-
ing to ban common ownership of different types of communication media in a
single media market. Id. at 334 (citing 33 Fed. Reg. 5315 (1968)).
3. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d) (1994). The regulation provides, in pertinent part:
(d) Daily newspaper cross-ownership rule. No license for an AM, FM
or TV broadcast station shall be granted to any party (including all parties
under common control) if such party directly or indirectly owns, operates
or controls a daily newspaper and the grant of such license will result in:
... (3) The Grade A contour of a TV station, computed in accordance
with § 73.684, encompassing the entire community in which such newspa-
per is published.
Id. The section further provides: "Note 6: For the purpose of this section a daily
newspaper is one which is published four or more days per week, which is in the
English language, and which is circulated generally in the community of publica-
tion. A college newspaper is not considered as being generally circulated." 47
C.F.R. § 73.3555 n.6 (1994).
4. Hoffman, supra note 2, at 335 (citing Second Report and Order, 50
F.C.C.2d at 1047).
5. Id. With respect to 16 "egregious cases" where an entire local media mar-
ket was monopolized by an existing combination, the Second Report and Order
required divestiture. Id. (citing Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d at 1080).
(613)
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interest, convenience, and necessity."6 While the FCC is an admin-
istrative agency of the executive branch, historically, Congress has
attempted to exert oversight prerogatives over the Commission. 7 In
the view of congressional oversight committees, the idea that the
FCC is an "arm of Congress" has long existed and still persists.8
Since the 1980s, when the FCC sought broad deregulation of com-
munications, the pro-regulation congressional oversight commit-
tees have vehemently fought to make the FCC enforce its own
regulations and heed congressional wishes. 9
The Commission rationalized the adoption of the cross-owner-
ship ban as serving the public interest, 10 concluding that the ban
furthered the goal of upholding First Amendment rights by "pro-
6. Broadcasting Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1988). This statutory mandate
is subjective; scholars in the telecommunications field have criticized it as "ill de-
fined to the point of being meaningless." Neal Devins, Congress, the FCC, and the
Search for the Pubic Trustee, 56 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 145, 147 (Autumn 1993).
Professor Devins further states, "[n]early sixty years old, this open-ended delega-
tion governs virtually all FCC operations." Id. The statute also requires the FCC to
find that the granting of a broadcast license would serve the "public interest, con-
venience, and necessity." Hoffman, supra note 2, at 333 n.2 (citing 47 U.S.C.
§ 309(a) (1982)).
7. Devins, supra note 6, at 147. Congress acted on the belief that "[riegular
and systematic oversight will increase Commission accountability for the imple-
mentation of congressional policy." Id. at 148 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 208,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 899 (1981)). Based on this belief, the House Telecommuni-
cations Subcommittee has more than doubled the size of its staff since 1980 to
ensure effective oversight. Id. (citing Micromanagement of the FCC: Here to Stay,
BROADCASTING, Dec. 26, 1988, at 56, 57).
8. Devins, supra note 6, at 148-49. Former Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives Sam Rayburn once said to President John F. Kennedy's FCC Chair
Newton Minow: 'Just remember one thing, son. Your agency is an arm of the
Congress; you belong to us. Remember that and you'll be alright." Id. (quoting
ERWIN G. KRASNOW, ET AL., THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION 89 (3d ed.
1982)). More recently, Senator Robert Packwood said to FCC Chair Mark Fowler:
"[Y]ou are a creature of Congress and you attempt to administer... [the] laws in
accordance with what you think Congress has intended." Id. at 149 (quoting Joint
Hearings, The Universal Telephone Service Preservation Act of 1983, 98th Cong., ist Sess.
67 (1983)).
9. Id. at 145-46. The Commission used whatever means it could to achieve its
deregulatory goals. Id. at 146. Professor Devins expanded on this matter, stating:
When political circumstances allowed the FCC to invoke the Constitution
to support its political agenda, the FCC paid homage to the supreme law
of the land. When the political costs of advancing its constitutional inter-
pretation were high, the FCC did not abide by its constitutional scruples
.... Congress .. . labelled [the FCC] a political malfeasant hiding be-
hind irrelevant constitutional subterfuge.
Id.
10. Hoffman, supra note 2, at 336. The Commission found that the ban
would promote diversity of viewpoints and economic competition. Id. (citing Sec-
ond Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046, 1048 (1975)). In the Second Report
and Order, the Commission defined public interest as including "the widest possi-
ble dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources." Id. at 336
2
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moting dissemination of information from diverse viewpoints.""u
The Supreme Court upheld the validity of this ban in FCC v. Na-
tional Citizens Committee for Broadcasting.2 Despite judicial approval
of the ban, the FCC has allowed parties to contravene the ban
through the use of temporary waivers.13 Faced with such waivers,
Congress has clearly expressed its desire that the ban be strictly
enforced. 14
The continued viability, and even necessity, of the cross-owner-
ship ban has been challenged, particularly in large media mar-
kets. 15 Significant development of a wide range of viewing and
listening options results in easier entry into new electronic media
markets.' 6 Many believe that this economic and technical progress
n.17 (quoting Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d at 1048 (quoting Associated
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945))).
11. Jonathan W. Emord, The First Amendment Invalidity of FCC Ownership Regu-
lations, 38 CATH. U. L. REv. 401, 416 (1989) (citing Second Report and Order, 50
F.C.C.2d at 1049, 1050-51). The Commission justified this ban by citing spectrum
scarcity and the physical limitations of the broadcast media. Id. at 416-17.
12. 436 U.S. 775 (1978). For full discussion of this case, see infra notes 67-72
and accompanying text.
13. Hoffman, supra note 2, at 337 (citing Second Report and Order, 50
F.C.C.2d at 1085). The Commission could grant such waivers in situations where it
determined that preservation of existing ownership patterns would better serve the
underlying purposes of the cross-ownership rule. Id. at 337 n.33 (citing Second
Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d at 1085). For the text of the Commission policy on
situations where the grant of temporary waivers is justified, see infra note 66.
14. Devins, supra note 6, at 166. An intense interest in continuing the ban on
cross-ownership forced Congress to hold hearings in 1985 to "underline, under-
score, and emphasize to people the importance of [preventing) concentration and
cross-ownership." Id. (quoting Media Mergers and Takeovers: The FCC and the Public
Interest, Hearings before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and
Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985),
reprinted in part in 134 CONG. REc. S65 (daily ed.Jan. 26, 1988) (statement of Rep.
Wirth)). Later in that year, the oversight committee sent a letter to the FCC es-
pousing the vital importance of the cross-ownership rules. Id. (quoting Letter from
House of Representatives, Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Fi-
nance of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, to Mark S. Fowler (Nov. 13, 1985), H.R.
No. 453, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 433 (1985), reprinted in 134 CONG. REc. S65 (daily ed.
Jan. 26, 1988)) [hereinafter Letter from House of Representatives, Subcomm. on Telecom-
munications to Mark S. Fowler]. The letter stated that the Commission should in-
crease its scrutiny of any requests for waivers of the cross-ownership ban. Id.
(quoting Letter from House of Representatives, Subcomm. on Telecommunications to Mark
S. Fowler, supra).
15. Emord, supra note 11, at 440. From the mid-1970s to the end of the
1980s, the number of broadcast media outlets increased dramatically. Id.
16. Id. at 445. In a 1987 study, Peter Vestal of the National Association of
Broadcasters' Research and Planning Department found that the average market
(from those tracked by the A.C. Nielson Company) had" 'access to 36 cable chan-
nels .... ten over-the-air television signals, 20.4 AM and 19.5 FM radio signals, 15.9
newspapers, 11.8 magazines each with subscription rates of at least five percent,
and a VCR penetration rate of 48.7%.' " Id. at 445-46 (quoting PETER VESTAL, AN
1996]
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has rendered the policy concerns which originally justified the ban,
especially those regarding economic and viewpoint monopoliza-
tion, obsolete. 17
In 1993, the FCC granted a permanent waiver of the cross-own-
ership ban to Rupert Murdoch.18 Murdoch requested this perma-
nent waiver before he agreed to purchase the New York Post (Post).19
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit affirmed the Commission's grant of this permanent waiver
in Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches v. FCC.20
Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches focuses on the continu-
ing struggle between the Congress, the FCC and the media over the
FCC's cross-ownership ban. This note discusses the evolution of the
cross-ownership rule and the D.C. Circuit's decision in Metropolitan
Council of NAACP Branches. Section II establishes the factual back-
ground of the dispute in Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches.
Section III introduces the historical development of the cross-own-
ership rule and the legal framework surrounding Metropolitan Coun-
cil of NAACP Branches. Section IV analyzes the D.C. Circuit's
reasoning in the Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches opinion.
Section V examines the court's affirmation of the permanent waiver
in light of precedent, congressional interests and modern circum-
stances. Section VI discusses the impact of Metropolitan Council of
NAACP Branches on the continued existence of the cross-ownership
rule.
II. FACTS
Rupert Murdoch is the principal owner of Fox Television Sta-
tions, Inc. (Fox).21 In 1986 he acquired WNYW-TV, a New York
City television station.2 2 At the time of this acquisition, Murdoch
also owned the New York Post.23 Owning both a television station
and a newspaper in New York City placed Murdoch in violation of
ANALYSIS OF MEDIA OUTLETS By MARKET, app. II (1987) (prepared for Research
and Planning Department, National Association of Broadcasters)).
17. Id. at 445. Today, nearly every media market "is filled with a great variety
of video images and radio voices, all competing for the public eye and ear." Id.
18. Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches v. FCC, 46 F.3d 1154, 1157-59
(D.C. Cir. 1995). Murdoch is the owner of Fox Television Stations, Inc. Id. at
1157.
19. Id. The Post was bankrupt at the time of Murdoch's agreement to
purchase it. Id.
20. Id. at 1166.
21. Id. at 1157.
22. Id.
23. Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches, 46 F.3d at 1157.
[Vol. III: p. 613
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the cross-ownership ban and the Commission gave him a two year
period to divest his interest in the Post.24 Before the two years
elapsed, Murdoch sold the newspaper.2 5 After the sale, the newspa-
per and its new owner struggled to remain solvent.26 The newspa-
per's eventual bankruptcy caused readership and advertising sales
to drop and resulted in serious operational difficulties. 27 As a result
of these problems, government officials asked Murdoch and Fox to
repurchase the newspaper.28 Despite these requests, Fox was in
competition with Champion Holding Company in the bidding for
the Post.29 Ultimately, every bid except Murdoch's was rejected
either by the Post Company or by the bankruptcy court as "unrealis-
tic" or "insufficient."30
In March of 1993, Fox executed a management agreement for
control of the Post which the bankruptcy court approved.31 This
agreement was conditioned upon, among other things, Murdoch's
ability to obtain a permanent waiver of the FCC's cross-ownership
24. Id. (citing 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d) (1994)).
25. Id. Real estate developer Peter Kalikow purchased the Post in 1988. Id.
26. Id. Kalikow declared personal bankruptcy in 1991, and despite his own
efforts and the efforts of his bankruptcy creditors committee, negotiations to sell
the Post to various groups failed through 1992. Id. In 1993, real estate developer
Abraham Hirschfeld agreed to purchase the newspaper, and the search for alterna-
tive buyers ceased. Id. After Hirschfeld was given operational control, his manage-
rial decisions lead to disputes with the paper's editorial staff. Id. These arguments
prevented Hirschfeld from completing the purchase of the newspaper. Id. At this
point Kalikow initiated bankruptcy proceedings for the Post's parent company, the
New York Post Co. Id.
27. Id. Financial distress caused the newspaper to struggle to obtain produc-
tion supplies, to provide employee benefits and to pay taxes. Id.
28. Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches, 46 F.3d at 1157. Mario Cuomo,
governor of New York, was among the officials requesting that Murdoch buy the
Post. Id.
29. Id. Champion Holding Company (Champion), tried to tender a check
for $ 1,000,000 to the bankruptcy court. Id. The court refused to accept the offer
because it was concerned that it had not received offers from all of the bidders
interested in purchasing the Post. Id. Champion continued its efforts to buy the
paper by entering into a memorandum of understanding with the Vice President
of the New York Post Company to purchase the Post's assets for $ 7,400,000. Id.
The agreement was to be finalized after approval by the Post's committee of un-
secured creditors and upon evidence that the Vice President had authorization to
execute the memorandum on behalf of the Post. Id. The creditor's committee
rejected the offer on the grounds that the purchase price was insufficient, that
Champion relied upon unrealistic union concessions and that Champion lacked
sufficient working capital. Id.
30. Id. When the committee notified Champion that it was rejecting its bid,
Champion expressed continued interest. Id. However, three months after the
bankruptcy court approved Murdoch's offer, Champion withdrew its offer. Id.
31. Id. Under the terms of this agreement, Murdoch was to assume opera-
tional control of the Post. Id.
1996]
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ban. 32 The agreement provided that if the conditions were not
met, the agreement would terminate on June 1, 1993.33
When Fox applied to the FCC for a permanent waiver of the
cross-ownership ban, it based its application on two grounds. 4
First, Fox argued that no other viable purchaser had demonstrated
a willingness to undertake the financial burden of revitalizing the
Post.3 5 Second, Fox claimed that the application of the cross-owner-
ship ban in this case would defeat the ban's underlying policy of
promoting diversity by resulting in the termination of a "competi-
tive voice." 36
The Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches, Champion
and various individuals appearing as commenters (appellants) op-
posed Murdoch's/Fox's request for a permanent waiver.37 Appel-
lants alleged that the FCC could not grant a permanent waiver to
the cross-ownership rule because Congress had provided that ap-
propriated funds could not be used to repeal or re-examine the
rules and practices established to administer the cross-ownership
rule. 38 Appellants sought hearings regarding alleged misrepresen-
tations by Fox as to the supposed impossibility of selling the pa-
per.3 9 Appellants also noted that preserving the Post would not
necessarily benefit diversity interests. 40 Appellants sought to elimi-
32. Id. The agreement was also conditioned upon negotiations of new labor
agreements with the labor unions representing the Post's workforce. Id.
33. Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches, 46 F.3d at 1157. This agreement
also provided that Murdoch retained an option to extend the agreement for an
additional 30 days in the event Fox had not yet obtained a waiver from the FCC.
Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1157-58. Collaterally, Fox argued that no bidder had demonstrated
the managerial or editorial skills requisite for operation of a newspaper in New
York's competitive news environment. Id. at 1158.
36. Id. Fox argued that because the cross-ownership ban sought to further
diversity of viewpoints, denial of the waiver request here would result in the elimi-
nation of the Post, a competitive member of New York's media market, thereby
actually resulting in a less diverse market. Id.
37. Id.
38. Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches, 46 F.3d at 1158 (citing Pub. L. No.
102-395, 106 Stat. 1846 (1992)).
39. Id. The appellants argued that Murdoch was not the only viable pur-
chaser and outlined Champion's offer to buy the paper. Id.
40. Id. Commenters, appearing in the appeal as intervenors, alleged that the
Post frequently attacked the African-American community. Id. These opponents
of the waiver noted that if the paper went out of business, minority owned newspa-
pers would potentially have greater access to the market's advertising funds. Id.
6
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nate Murdoch as a bidder so that minority businesspersons could
purchase the Post.41
The FCC expedited Fox's request,42 and in a declaratory ruling
adopted June 29, 1993, granted the permanent waiver.43 The grant
of the waiver was premised on the finding that Murdoch's eligibility
to buy the Post best served the public interest by allowing the bank-
ruptcy court to consider all of the eligible bidders. 44 In its ruling,
the FCC discussed the nature of, and the reasoning behind, the
cross-ownership ban.45 The Commission found that a denial of
Fox's request would defeat the ban's purposes. 46
41. Id. The commenters saw the demise of the Post as a means of opening
new opportunities for minority-owned papers. Id.
42. Id. The Commission commented on the dire financial need of the news-
paper, calling the circumstances "unique," and it found that as such, the condi-
tions called for the Commission's "immediate attention." Id. (citing Fox Television
Stations, Inc., 8 F.C.C.R. 5341, 5343-44 (1993)). Further, the Commission found
that quick resolution would minimize conflict with bankruptcy law, which has the
objectives of equality of distribution among creditors, a fresh start for debtors and
efficient administration of cases. Id. (citing Fox Television Stations, Inc., 8
F.C.C.R. at 5343-44).
43. Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches, 46 F.3d at 1158 (citing Fox Televi-
sion Stations, Inc., 8 F.C.C.R at 5341). The permanent waiver was granted by a
two-to-one vote of the Commissioners. Id. (citing Fox Television Stations, Inc., 8
F.C.C.R. at 5341). The Commission stated that waivers to this ban were granted in
four situations where application of the ban would be unnecessarily harsh:
(1) where there is an inability to dispose of an interest to conform to the
rules; (2) where the only sale possible is at an artificially depressed price;
(3) where separate ownership and operation of the newspaper and sta-
tion cannot be supported in the locality; and (4) where, for whatever rea-
son, the purposes of the rule would be disserved by divestiture.
Id. (quoting Fox Television Stations, Inc., 8 F.C.C.R. at 5348 (footnote omitted)).
44. Id. at 1158 (citing Fox Television Stations, Inc., 8 F.C.C.R. at 5344). While
not calling Fox the only viable bidder, the ruling stated that excluding Fox as a
potential buyer might "ultimately disserve the underlying diversity purposes of the
cross-ownership rule and would not accord the proper deference to the policies
and objectives of bankruptcy law." Id. (quoting Fox Television Stations, Inc., 8
F.C.C.R. at 5344).
45. Id. (citing Fox Television Stations, Inc., 8 F.C.C.R. at 5347-50). The FCC
stated that the ban arose from two fundamental principles. Id. (citing Fox Televi-
sion Stations, Inc., 8 F.C.C.R. at 5347). The first and most important principle was
the need to promote diverse viewpoints. Id. (citing Fox Television Stations, Inc., 8
F.C.C.R. at 5347). The second principle offered by the FCC was the prevention of
undue concentration of economic power. Id. (citing Fox Television Stations, Inc.,
8 F.C.C.R. at 5347).
46. Id. (citing Fox Television Stations, Inc., 8 F.C.C.R. at 5348). The ruling
stated that Fox's request satisfied the fourth criterion for waiver, "where for
whatever reason the purposes of the rule would be disserved by divestiture," and
thus the Commission concluded that a permanent waiver was appropriate. Id. (cit-
ing Fox Television Stations, Inc., 8 F.C.C.1R at 5349). For the list of criteria for
waiver of the cross-ownership rule, see supra note 43.
1996]
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The Commission ruled that Murdoch was uniquely suited to
meet the needs of the failing Post.4 7 Further, the FCC stated that
the size and nature of the New York media market alleviated its
concern about an undue concentration of power over the dissemi-
nation of information in this case. 48 The appellants called for a
more probing factual inquiry regarding the circumstances underly-
ing the waiver request.49 The FCC declined this request and ruled
that the weight of evidence did not create a substantial and material
question of fact justifying further review.50
On September 15, 1993, the bankruptcy court authorized Mur-
doch's purchase of the Post.51 The court found Fox was the only
realistic bidder.52 The court concluded that without this purchase
by Murdoch, continued losses by the paper would likely lead to its
liquidation. 53 On December 17, 1993, the FCC denied the appel-
47. Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches, 46 F.3d at 1158. The FCC noted
that the Post required a substantial capital outlay and a purchaser with newspaper
expertise. Id. (citing Fox Television Stations, Inc., 8 F.C.C.R. at 5349-50). The
Commission further noted that a 16 month search had failed to produce a "suita-
ble" buyer since the paper had been put into bankruptcy. Id. (citing Fox Televi-
sion Stations, Inc., 8 F.C.C.R. at 5349-50). The FCC stated that evidence existed to
show that ownership by Murdoch could be pivotal to the paper's viability. Id.
48. Id. at 1158-59 (citing Fox Television Stations, Inc., 8 F.C.C.R. at 5351-52).
The FCC reasoned that in light of the wide spectrum of broadcast stations and
newspapers in New York, the possibility that Murdoch would amass an inordinate
amount of control in the marketplace was small and that preservation of the Post
outweighed any cost to diversity due to the waiver. Id.
49. Id. at 1159. The Caucus for Media Diversity alleged that Fox had made
material misrepresentations of fact in its request for the waiver by demanding that
the Commission rule by June 1, 1993, and by claiming that it was the only viable
bidder. Id.
50. Id. (citing Fox Television Stations, Inc., 8 F.C.C.R at 5355). The Commis-
sion found that by setting an imperative time limit Fox may have been misleading,
but its behavior did not materially distort the facts. Id. (citing Fox Television Sta-
tions, Inc., 8 F.C.C.R at 5356). The Commission also found that Fox's statements
regarding other purchasers merely stated Fox's opinion that no other viable pur-
chasers existed, and that Fox was unaware of Champion's continued interest when
it filed its waiver request. Id. (citing Fox Television Stations, Inc., 8 F.C.C.R. at
5356-57).
51. Id. at 1159 (citing In re New York Post Co., No. 93-B-41306 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y 1993)).
52. Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches, 46 F.3d at 1159 (citing In re New
York Post Co., No. 93-B-41306 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1993)). The bankruptcy court de-
termined that other parties had reasonable opportunities to make competitive bids
but failed to do so. Id. (citing In re New York Post Co., No. 93-B-41306 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y 1993)).
53. Id. (citing In re New York Post Co., No. 93-B-41306 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y
1993)).
[Vol. III: p. 613
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The FCC grants initial licenses for television and radio broad-
cast stations, or renewal of those licenses, only if it finds that the
public interest, convenience and necessity will be served.55
Through its early licensing policies, the Commission advanced the
theory that diversification of mass media ownership served the pub-
lic interest by promoting diversity of program and service view-
points, as well as by preventing undue concentration of economic
power.56 Beyond diversification, however, the Commission consid-
ered many other factors relevant to the public interest 57 The para-
mount policy of the Commission was to avoid undue disruption of
existing service. 58
54. Id. (citing Fox Television Stations, Inc., 8 F.C.C.R. 8744 (1993)). The
Commission ruled that the issue of misrepresentation was fully considered and
rejected in the declaratory ruling. Id. (citing Fox Television Stations, Inc., 8
F.C.C.L 8744 (1993)).
55. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 780
(1978) (citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(a), (d), 308(a), 309(a), (d) (1994)). These
licenses are granted pursuant to the regulatory scheme established by the Radio
Act of 1927 and the Communications Act of 1934. Id. (citing Radio Act of 1927, 44
Stat. 1162 (1927); Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1934)).
56. Id. (citing Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television Broadcast
Stations, 45 F.C.C. 1476, 1476-77 (1964)). Since the 1940s the Commission has
implemented an increasingly more stringent line of regulations on broadcast sta-
tion ownership. Id. The Commission has prohibited ownership of more than one
station in the same broadcast service, limited the total number of stations in each
service that a person or entity could control or own and prohibited common own-
ership of a television and radio station in the same market. Id. (citing Multiple
Ownership of Standard Broadcast Stations (AM Radio), 8 Fed. Reg. 16065 (1943);
Rules and Regulations Governing Standard and High Frequency Broadcast Sta-
tions (FM Radio), § 3.228(a), 5 Fed. Reg. 2382, 2384 (1940); Multiple Ownership
of AM, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, 18 F.C.C. 288 (1953); Multiple Own-
ership of Standard FM and Television Broadcast Stations, 22 F.C.C.2d 306 (1970),
as modified, 28 F.C.C.2d 662 (1971)).
57. Id. at 782. The Commission maintained another, sometimes conflicting,
goal of ensuring the "best practicable service to the public." Id. (quoting Policy
Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 394 (1965)). The
Commission attempted to achieve this goal weighing various factors, other than
diversification of ownership, when making licensing decisions. Id. These factors
include the anticipated contribution of the owner to station operations, proposed
program service and the past broadcast record of the applicant. Id. (citing Policy
Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d at 395-400).
58. Id. As a result of this policy consideration, newspaper owners in a number
of instances obtained broadcast licenses for stations serving the same communities
as their newspapers, and the FCC frequently renewed such licenses, finding that
continuation of service offered by a common owner would best serve the public
interest. Id. at 783.
19961
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Before formulating any formal policy on cross-ownership, the
Commission denied the owner of a newspaper renewal of a broad-
cast station license, and the newspaper appealed this decision to
the D.C. Circuit.59 Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC established
that the Commission could select the cross-ownership policies it
deemed to be in the public interest. 60 Acknowledging that an
agency's view of what is in the public interest may change either
with or without a change in circumstances, the D.C. Circuit found
that when an agency changes its course it must supply a reasoned
analysis indicating that prior policies and standards are being inten-
tionally and deliberately changed, and are not casually ignored. 61
The court found that the Commission did not exceed its powers by
attempting to avoid, rather than condone, a concentration of con-
trol of the sources of news and opinions.62
59. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 844 (D.C. Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). In 1957, the FCC concluded a three year
selection process for a licensee to operate a television station in Boston by granting
the license to WHDH, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of the corporate publisher
of the Boston Herald-Traveler. Id. (citing WHDH, Inc., 22 F.C.C. 767 (1957)). Ad-
dressing concerns of improper ex parte contacts with the Commission's chairman,
the Commission allowed WHDH, Inc. to maintain temporary authorization to op-
erate the station, but it reconsidered all of the applicants for the license in a new
proceeding. Id. at 844-45 (citing WHDH, Inc., 29 F.C.C. 204 (1960)). Following
these proceedings, a hearing examiner challenged the need for diversification of
ownership of the television stations and newspapers in a single market. Id. at 846.
The license was granted to another applicant instead of WHDH, Inc., with the FCC
emphasizing the need to diversify the market. Id. at 848.
60. Id. at 851. The court noted that its supervisory function was to assure that
the agency had given reasoned consideration to all the material facts and issues.
Id. (citing Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 792 (1968); Scenic Hud-
son Preservation Conference v. F.P.C., 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 941 (1966); City of Pittsburgh v. F.P.C., 237 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1956). The
court's responsibilities do not merely involve review of procedure or legislative
mandate, but require inquiry into whether "the agency has ... really taken a 'hard
look' at the salient problems." Id. (citing Pikes Peak Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 422
F.2d 671 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 979 (1969); WAIT Radio v. FCC, 418 F.2d
1153 (D.C. Cir. 1969)).
61. Id. at 852 (citing City of Chicago v. F.P.C., 385 F.2d 629, 637 (D.C. Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 945 (1968); New Castle County Airport Comm'n v.
C.A.B., 371 F.2d 733, 735 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 930 (1967); Pinel-
las Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 230 F.2d 204, 206 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
1007 (1956)). The court stated that "if an agency glosses over or swerves from
prior precedents without discussion it may cross the line from the tolerably terse to
the intolerably mute." Id. (citing Marine Space Enclosures, Inc. v. F.M.C., 420 F.2d
577, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1969); WAIT Radio v. FCC, 418 F.2d 1153, 1157 (D.C. Cir.
1969)).
62. Id. at 859 (citing McClacthy Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 239 F.2d 15 (D.C.
Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 918 (1957); Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 189
F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 830 (1951)). The court stated that while
the course adopted by the Commission was novel, it was not arbitrary and unrea-
sonable. Id. Further, the court found that although the need for diversity and the
10
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In 1968, the Commission began the rulemaking process to con-
sider a restrictive policy toward newspaper ownership of radio and
television broadcast stations that culminated in the 1975 Second
Report and Order.63 The Commission determined such a rule
would be in the public interest, noting that "public interest encom-
passes many factors including 'the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources.' "64 The Com-
mission justified this policy by stating that increases in diversifica-
tion of ownership would enhance diversity of viewpoints.65
However, the Commission expressly retained the power to provide
waivers of the ban in exceptional circumstances. 66
In FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, the
Supreme Court addressed the validity of the FCC's cross-ownership
regulations.67 Affirming the judgment of the D.C. Circuit, the
danger of concentration was not as great in Boston as in smaller markets, it was a
factor to which the FCC could give dominant weight. Id. at 859-60.
63. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 783-84
(1978). The Commission concluded that it had statutory authority to promulgate
the cross-ownership ban under the Communications Act. Id. at 784 (citing Second
Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046, 1048 (1975) (citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 152(a),
154(i), 154(j), 301, 303, 309(a) (1994))). The Commission further determined
that the regulation was valid under the First and Fifth Amendments of the Consti-
tution. Id. at 784-85 (citing Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d at 1048).
64. Id. at 785 (citing Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d at 1048 (quoting
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1940))). The Commission grounded
its ban on ownership of co-located newspaper-broadcast combinations primarily
upon First Amendment considerations. Id. (citing Second Report and Order, 50
F.C.C.2d at 1049).
65. Id. at 786 (citing Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d at 1076). The
Commission found that in the absence of persuasive countervailing considerations,
"even a small gain in diversity" was "worth pursuing." Id. (citing Second Report
and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d at 1080 n.30).
66. Id. n.9 (citing Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d at 1076 n.24, 1077).
The FCC established three specific instances which would validate a waiver, and
one catch-all provision. Health and Medicine Policy Research Group v. FCC, 807
F.2d 1038, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The Commission policy stated:
It is not our intention that the [cross-ownership] rules should work a for-
feiture .... For this reason [1] inability to sell the station would be a
basis for waiver .... [2] We would take a similar view if the only sale
possible would have to be at an artificially depressed price. [3] Likewise,
if it could be shown that separate ownership and operation of the newspa-
per and station cannot be supported in the locality, waiver might well be
appropriate .... [4] Finally, if it could be shown for whatever reason that
the purposes of the rule ... would be better served by continuation of the
current ownership pattern, then waiver could be warranted.
Id. (citing Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d at 1085 (footnotes omitted)).
67. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. at 779. Petitioners in this
case, including the National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting (NCCB), the
National Association of Broadcasters (NAB), the American Newspaper Publishers
Association (ANPA) and several broadcast licensees subject to the divestiture re-
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Court upheld the FCC's prospective ban on cross-ownership. 68 The
Court also agreed that the Commission acted within its statutory
authority in concluding that the maximum benefit to the public
interest would follow from allocation of broadcast licenses to pro-
mote diversification of the mass media as a whole. 69 The Court
found that the regulations were based on permissible public inter-
est goals and were not unreasonable means to achieve such goals. 70
According to the Court, the Commission's decision to give con-
trolling weight to the goal of diversification in shaping its rule was a
reasonable administrative response to changed circumstances in
the broadcasting industry.71 Finally, the Court rejected the appel-
lants' argument that the Commission's regulations violated the First
Amendment rights of newspaper owners. 72
quirement, sought review of the constitutionality of the cross-ownership ban. Id. at
789.
68. Id. at 792. The Court also reversed in part the court of appeals' decision
vacating the rule's limited divestiture requirement. Id,
69. Id. at 795. The Court noted it was well established that the general rule-
making authority granted to the Commission under the Communications Act sup-
plied a statutory basis for the promulgation of regulations codifying the Commis-
sion's view of the public interest licensing standard, so long as that view was based
on consideration of permissible factors and was otherwise reasonable. Id. at 793
(citing United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956); National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943)).
70. Id. at 796. The Court riled that the Commission acted rationally in find-
ing that diversification of ownership would enhance the possibility of achieving
greater diversity of viewpoints. Id. The Court further held that the FCC could
reasonably find that achieving greater diversity of viewpoints would be in the pub-
lic interest. Id.
71. Id. at 797 (citing Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046, 1074-75
(1975); FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co. 309 U.S. 134, 137-38 (1940)). The
"changed circumstance" was the substantial decrease of channels open for new
licensing. Id. The Court also held that the Commission clearly did not take an
irrational view of the public interest in banning cross ownership. Id.
72. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. at 798. Appellants argued
that it was inconsistent with the First Amendment to promote diversification by
preventing newspaper owners from owning broadcast stations. Id. They urged
that the "government may [not] restrict the speech of some elements of our soci-
ety in order to enhance the relative voice of others." Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo,
426 U.S. 1, 50 n.55 (1976) (quoting Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973))). The Court found that appellants' argu-
ment ignored the fundamental proposition that there was no "unabridgeable First
Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to
speak, write, or publish." Id. (citing Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S at
367, 388-89 (1969)). The Court reasoned that the physical scarcity of broadcast
frequencies justified regulation of such frequencies. Id. (citing Red Lion Broadcast-
ing, 395 U.S at 387-88; National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,
210-18 (1943); Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289
U.S. 266, 282 (1933)). Recognizing the need for such regulation, the Court saw
nothing in the First Amendment to prevent the Commission from allocating
licenses to promote the public interest in diversification of the mass media. Id.
Further, the Court noted that requiring those wishing to obtain a broadcast license
[Vol. III: p. 613
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In 1986, the D.C. Circuit examined the validity of the grant of a
waiver to the cross-ownership ban. 73 In Health and Medicine Policy
Research Group v. FCC, a consortium of individuals and public inter-
est groups challenged the FCC's grant of a waiver of the cross-own-
ership ban stemming from the breakup of the former media
conglomerate known as Metromedia Radio and Television, Inc. 74
The Commission granted a two year waiver of the rule, finding such
a waiver consistent with the public interest.75 The court noted that
when the Commission established the cross-ownership ban, it ex-
pressly contemplated waivers for newly created combinations
brought about through a television licensee purchasing a daily
newspaper.76 The court also remarked that because the factual de-
terminations made by the Commission regarding the necessity of
to demonstrate that such licensing would serve the public interest did not restrict
the speech of those denied licenses; rather it preserved the interests of the people
as a whole in free speech. Id. at 800 (citing Red Lion Broadcasting, 395 U.S. at 390).
The Court concluded that the denial of an application for a license because the
public interest required such denial did not amount to a denial of free speech. Id.
(citing Red Lion Broadcasting, 395 U.S. at 389 (quoting National Broadcasting, 319
U.S. at 227)).
73. Health and Medicine Policy Research Group v. FCC, 807 F.2d 1038 (D.C.
Cir. 1986).
74. Id. at 1040. In 1985, News America Television, Inc., which changed its
name during the proceeding to Fox Television Stations, Inc., purchased a number
of Metromedia's television stations in major cities. Id. Rupert Murdoch, the
owner of Fox, already owned newspapers in two cities where Fox sought to
purchase stations. Id. Thus when Fox applied to obtain a transfer of Metromedia's
broadcasting licenses, it also requested a waiver of the FCC's cross-ownership rule.
Id. The appellants in this case argued that granting such waivers would reduce the
diversity of broadcast voices in the affected areas. Id. Fox based its application for
the waivers on the contention that a waiver would avoid a "distress sale" of two of
its newspapers, a recognized basis for such waivers. Id. For the list of recognized
reasons for waivers of the cross-ownership rules, see supra note 66.
75. Health and Medicine Policy Research Group, 807 F.2d at 1041 (citing In re
Applications of Metromedia Radio & Television, Inc., 59 R.RP2d (P & F) 1196
(1985)). The Commission found that the existence of numerous media outlets
serving the markets to which the waiver was applicable supported the conclusion
that no undue concentration of the media would result from a limited waiver. Id.
(citing Application of Metromedia, 59 R.R.2d at 1205). The Commission also rec-
ognized that market factors associated with sales of daily newspapers are different
than those affecting broadcast properties and, therefore, the two year waiver was
appropriate under the facts of this case. Id. (citing Application of Metromedia, 59
R.R.2d at 1205). The Commission believed that such a waiver period represented
a reasonable balance between the policies expressed in the cross-ownership rule
and the belief that, in divestiture cases, reasonable accommodations can be made
to avoid the risk of distress sales. Id. (citing In re Application of Metromedia, 59
R.R.2d at 1205).
76. Id. (citing Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046, 1076 n.25
(1975)). The court cited prior authorizations of cross-ownerships of television-ra-
dio and television-newspaper combinations. Id. (citing Gulf Broadcasting Co., 100
F.C.C.2d 238 (1984); Golden West Assoc., LP, 59 R.R.2d 125 (1985)). The court
also relied upon the established proposition that "[t]he possible waiver of viola-
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waiver were primarily of a judgmental or predictive nature, com-
plete factual support in the record for the Commission's judgment
was neither possible nor required. 77 Finding that review of the
Commission's decision was limited by an "arbitrary and capricious"
standard,7 8 the court stated that under circumstances like those at
issue, the Commission's judgment regarding how to best serve the
public interest required substantial judicial deference. 79 The court
concluded that although the evidence presented by Fox in support
of its distress-sale claim was scant, the evidence supported the FCC's
determination that waiver was appropriate. 80 Upholding the Com-
mission's grant of a temporary waiver to Fox, the court noted that if
a lack of diversity later became a problem, the Commission could
take necessary and appropriate corrective action.81
At this point, it is important to note that the Commission
granted not only temporary waivers to the cross-ownership ban, but
also granted one permanent waiver in Field Communications Corp.82
In Field Communications Corp., the FCC first highlighted the source
of its authority to grant waivers under certain circunstances.83 The
tions of agency rules is a question which is normally left up to agency discretion."
Id. (quoting WSTE-TV, Inc. v. FCC, 566 F.2d 333, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
77. Id. at 1043 (citing FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436
U.S. 775, 813 (1974)).
78. Id. (citing Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (1982)).
The court stated "the scope of review is particularly limited when the FCC engages
in 'the process of drawing lines, of making judgmental decisions.' " Id. (quoting
Stereo Broadcasters, Inc. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1026, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
79. Id. (citing FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 596 (1981)). In
FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, the Supreme Court stated: "diversity is not the only
policy the Commission must consider in fulfilling its responsibilities under the Act.
The Commission's implementation of the public interest standard is a task that
Congress has delegated to the Commission in the first instance." Id. at 1043-44
(quoting WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S at 596).
80. Health and Medicine Policy Research Group, 807 F.2d at 1044. The court
called Fox's showing "nothing to crow about." Id. Fox's "Public Interest State-
ment" discussed only in general terms the difficulty of selling newspapers, particu-
larly in markets with a dominant paper. Id. The statement also claimed that
denial of the waiver could threaten the continued viability of the newspapers,
which would counterproductively lead to a reduction in diversity. Id. Factors in
Fox's favor were the comparatively lenient evidentiary standard in distress sale
waiver request cases and the high degree of judicial deference to the Commission
when it undertakes this sort of function. Id. at 1044-45.
81. Id. at 1046.
82. 65 F.C.C.2d 959 (1977). Field Communications Corporation (Field) ap-
plied to the FCC for the assignment of licenses of five independent UHF television
stations. Id. Field already possessed a 22.5% ownership interest in these stations,
and sought to purchase the remaining 77.5% interest. Id. Field's parent corpora-
tion was the publisher of daily newspapers in two of the stations' markets, and thus
without waiver of the cross-ownership ban, the desired assignment of the licenses
would have placed Field in violation of FCC rules. Id.
83. Id. (citing Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046, 1085 (1975)).
[Vol. III: p. 613
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Commission further stated that while it had no intent to "relitigate
issues considered and rejected when the cross-ownership rule was
adopted... parties could bring... attention [to] whatever special
circumstances they thought had a bearing on the appropriateness
of granting such a waiver."84 The Commission found that the cross-
ownership rules were not applicable to existing ownership patterns
such as the one at issue here, and that granting the applications for
permanent waiver served the public interest.85 However, this ruling
seemed limited by the Commission's acknowledgment that this
grant was made because of the highly unusual facts of the case. 86
At the end of 1987, Congress passed Public Law 100-202 which
prescribed that no federal funds could be spent to re-examine or
repeal the FCC's cross-ownership ban or to extend the time limita-
tion for any temporary waivers to the rule already in existence.8 7 At
the time of the passage of this resolution, the sole holder of any
temporary waiver of the sort specified in the limitation was News
America Publishing, Inc. (now known as Fox). s88 News America
84. Id. In support of its application for waiver, Field submitted that "(1) en-
couragement of UHF television growth is the type of exigency... referred [to] in
providing for waivers; and (2) since there is no 'new entrant' in the market nor a
,new ownership pattern,' the present cross-ownership pattern was not intended [to
bar such reassignment]." Id.
85. Id.
86. See News America Publishing, Inc. v. FCC, 844 F.2d 800, 803 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (citing Brief for the FCC at 28 n.10). The D.C. Circuit interpreted the deci-
sion in Field Communications Corp. as having unique facts in that it concerned a
reacquisition that seemed to be little more than a pro forma transfer to a licensee
already approved for cross-ownership, and the permanent waiver was a "virtually
inevitable concomitant of the [cross-ownership ban's] original grandfathering pro-
tection." Id. at 803 n.4 (citing Field Communications Corp., 65 F.C.C.2d at 961).
87. Id. at 802 (citing Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329 (1987)). This limita-
tion was buried on page 34 of a 471 page resolution appropriating all federal gov-
ernment funds for the 1988 fiscal year. Id. More specifically, the limitation was in
a 379 word paragraph entitled "Federal Communications Commission Salaries and
Expenses," between a proviso concerning VHF channel assignments to educational
stations and a restriction on cellular telephone systems in rural areas. Id. The
provision provides in relevant part:
[N] one of the funds appropriated by this Act or under any other Act may
be used to repeal, to retroactively apply changes in, or to begin or con-
tinue a re-examination of the rules of the Federal Communications Com-
mission with respect to the common ownership of a daily newspaper and
a television station where the grade A contour of the television station
encompasses the entire community in which the newspaper is published
or to extend the time period of current grants of temporary waivers to
achieve compliance with such rules ....
Id. (citing Making Further Continuing Appropriations for the Fiscal Year Ending September
30, 1988, H.R. REP. No. 498, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1987)).
88. Id. In November 1985 and November 1986, Fox received FCC permission
for its acquisition of the licenses of WNYW-TV in New York City and WXNE-TV in
Boston. Id. at 804. Because News America owned the New York Post and the Boston
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challenged Public Law 100-202 under the First and Fifth Amend-
ments of the Constitution.89
The D.C. Circuit found that the provision dealing with exten-
sion of temporary waivers applied to only one publisher/broad-
caster.90 In such circumstances, the potential for First Amendment
abuses is so great that a mere invocation of Congress's "conven-
tional power to approach a problem one step at a time" could not
alter the invalidity of this provision.91 The court found the last
eighteen words of the provision unconstitutional; reasoning that,
regardless of whether the waiver process was constitutionally com-
pelled, First Amendment values were implicated in the processes,
thus mandating evenhanded treatment of all applicants.92
Herald, these acquisitions required waivers of the cross-ownership rule, which the
Commission granted. Id. In spite of the passage of the provision in question in
this case, in 1988 News America applied to the FCC for an extension of these
existing waivers. Id. at 802. The FCC denied these applications, finding that the
provision barred such extension. Id.
89. Id. at 802. In its review of News America's argument, the court only con-
sidered the last 18 words of the provision. Id. n.1. The court found that the lan-
guage forbidding re-examination of the cross-ownership rule was not ripe for
review. Id. News America claimed that although the limitation on extension of
temporary waivers was general in form, it was not general in reality because it bur-
dened only one broadcaster/publisher. Id. at 802. The court determined that
under the First and Fifth Amendments, the provision needed to be scrutinized
under a test more stringent than the "minimum rationality" test usually employed
for conventional economic legislation under equal protection analysis. Id. Primar-
ily, News America challenged the provision based on the intersection of the First
Amendment's protection of free speech and the Equal Protection Clauses's re-
quirement that government afford similar treatment to similarly situated persons.
Id. at 804.
90. Id. at 810. The court determined that the sole purpose of the Amend-
ment was to deny Rupert Murdoch and News America an extension of the only
existing temporary waiver. Id.
91. Id. at 815. The court emphasized that the Supreme Court in upholding
the cross-ownership ban against First Amendment challenge, found that the "rea-
sonableness" of the ban was "underscored" by the availability of waivers in situa-
tions where a station or newspaper could not survive without common ownership.
Id. (quoting FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 802
n.20 (1978)).
92. News Am. Publishing, Inc. v. FCC, 844 F.2d 800, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
The court ruled that "more is required than 'minimum rationality'" in order to
sustain the provision. Id. at 814. The court viewed the provision as "astonishingly
underinclusive" because:
[i]n short, every publisher in the country other than Murdoch can knock
on the FCC's door and seek the exercise of its discretion to secure, either
by a single temporary waiver or by a waiver coupled with an extension, a
period of exemption from the cross-ownership restrictions longer than
that to which News America is restricted as a matter of law.
Id. Although Congress need not eliminate a problem all at once, the court deter-
mined that it must "reject as facile one-bite-at-a-time explanation for rules affecting
important First Amendment values." Id. at 815.
[Vol. III: p. 613
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In a dissenting opinion in News America Publishing, Inc., Judge
Robinson acknowledged that over time the Commission's attitude
toward the cross-ownership rule changed to the point that the Com-
mission might even favor repeal of the rule.93 Judge Robinson
wrote that Public Law 100-202 was merely Congress's reaction to
what it perceived as the threatened erosion, if not eradication of
the cross-ownership rule.94 Judge Robinson ultimately found that
Congress's purpose in enacting the provision was to preserve the
cross-ownership rule and promote First Amendment values, and
that this purpose added substantial weight to the governmental in-
terest in the legislation. 95 Thus, Judge Robinson stated that he
would have found the entire provision valid because it pursued the
government's wholly legitimate purpose of protecting the cross-
ownership rule from circumvention or erosion.96
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
Judge Sentelle, writing for the unanimous court in Metropolitan
Council of NAACP Branches v. FCC,97 affirmed the FCC's decision to
93. Id. at 816 (Robinson, J., dissenting). Judge Robinson quoted from the
Commission's Brief, which stated:
This is not to say that, in the Commission's view, continuing the ban on
newspaper/television cross-ownership for another year is necessarily
good public policy. Indeed, had Congress not provided otherwise, the
Commission might have concluded that the present rule against newspa-
per/television cross-ownership should have been reviewed to determine
whether it continued to serve the public interest.
Id. n.9 (Robinson, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for the Appellee at 16).
94. Id. at 817 (Robinson,J., dissenting). Senator Hollings said, "I am trying to
catch a runaway Federal Communications Commission. They are the ones who
have been edging to not just another waiver but permanent repeal." Id. at 819
n.25 (Robinson, J., dissenting) (quoting 134 CONG. REc. S57 (daily ed. Jan. 26,
1988) (Statement of Sen. Hollings)).
95. Id. at 818 (Robinson, J., dissenting). The FCC's Congressional oversight
subcommittee wrote, "we firmly believe that the cross-ownership rules are vitally
important in protecting competition in the marketplace of ideas and that waivers
to those rules should be viewed as an extraordinary, not an ordinary action." Id.
(Robinson, J., dissenting) (quoting Letter from House of Representatives Subcomm. on
Telecommunications to Mark S. Fowler, supra note 14).
96. Id. at 823 (Robinson, J., dissenting). Judge Robinson found that the in-
tent of Congress was to preserve the cross-ownership rule, and that Congress deter-
mined that grant of waivers weakened or circumvented the rule. Id. at 820
(Robinson, J., dissenting). Therefore, Judge Robinson believed that a congres-
sional prohibition on extensions of waivers, even if only applicable to already ex-
isting waivers, was based upon a permissible legislative purpose. Id. (Robinson, J.,
dissenting).
97. 46 F.3d 1154, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Judges Randolph and Rofers joined
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grant to Fox a permanent waiver of the cross-ownership ban.9 8 The
D.C. Circuit addressed four issues raised on appeal. 99 The first is-
sue concerned alleged misrepresentations of fact by Fox.100 Appel-
lants alleged that there was prima facie evidence that Fox possessed
intent to deceive and that the FCC improperly failed to order a
hearing on the alleged misrepresentation.101 Appellants further ar-
gued that the Commission erred in assuming the evidence had to
prove intent to deceive before a hearing was required.10 2 Appel-
lants urged that the FCC arbitrarily and capriciously departed from
precedent by denying a hearing on the alleged misrepresenta-
tions. 103 Further, appellants claimed that Fox demonstrated a pat-
tern of misrepresentations and thus the FCC erred in not ordering
further inquiry into this behavior.10 4
Preliminarily, the court acknowledged that it owed substantial
deference to an agency decision, and that the decision must be up-
held unless an agency's action is an "arbitrary, capricious.... abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."105 The
court rejected appellants' assertions that Fox had intentionally
made misrepresentations and the court dismissed the contention
98. Id. at 1162. For the text of the FCC policy at issue, see supra note 3.
99. Id. at 1157. The appeal was taken directly from the decision of the FCC to
grant the permanent waiver. Id. at 1156.
100. Id. at 1159. Appellants argued that Fox seriously misrepresented the
facts in setting a June 1, 1993 deadline for the termination of its offer. Id.
101. Id. See David Ortiz Radio Corp. v. FCC, 941 F.2d 1253, 1260 (D.C. Cir.
1991) (fraudulent intent shown by misrepresentation together with proof that
party making statement knows of falsehood); California Pub. Broadcasting Forum
v. FCC, 752 F.2d 670, 680 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (FCC's denial of hearing on substantial
and material factual dispute was arbitrary and capricious).
102. Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches, 46 F.3d at 1159. See Citizens for
Jazz on WRVR, Inc. v. FCC, 775 F.2d 392, 397 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (to warrant hearing,
allegations must merely show substantial and material question of fact, not actually
prove misrepresentation).
103. Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches, 46 F.3d at 1159-60. Appellants
urged that the Commission's determination that there was not a substantial ques-
tion on Fox's misrepresentation was untenable, particularly in light of the FCC's
long-established requirement that applicants be "scrupulous in providing com-
plete and meaningful information." Id. at 1160 (quoting Lorain Journal Co. v.
FCC, 351 F.2d 824, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 967 (1966)).
104. Id. at 1160. Appellants alleged that Fox had previously made misrepre-
sentations in a comparative renewal proceeding for KTTV, Los Angeles. Id.
105. Id. (quoting Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701, 706(2) (A)
(1988)). Using a deferential standard, the court needed to decide "whether the
agency has articulated a rational connection between the facts and the choice
made [and] may reverse only if the agency's decision is not supported by substan-
tial evidence or the agency has made a clear error in judgment." Id. (quoting
Kisser v. Cisneros, 14 F.3d 615, 619 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
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that the FCC arbitrarily and capriciously denied hearings on these
alleged misrepresentations. 06
The second issue addressed by the court concerned the ripe-
ness of the waiver request and inadequacy of the evidence before
the FCC. 107 The court rejected appellants' contention that the
waiver request was not ripe because agencies are not controlled
by the case or controversy requirement.108 The court then rejected
appellants' argument that the information before the FCC was
incomplete. 109
The third issue considered by the court was whether recusal
was required by any of the Commissioners who considered this
case. °10 Appellants urged that one of the Commissioners voting on
the permanent waiver appeared to have prejudged the issue and
should have recused himself."' The court rejected this argument
and called the ad hominem attack on the Commission's decision
"unfortunate."112
106. Id. See WHW Enters., Inc. v. FCC, 753 F.2d 1132, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(court attempts only to determine whether FCC's conclusions have support in rec-
ord and are not arbitrary or capricious when reviewing Commission's application
of standards for honesty and frankness).
107. Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches, 46 F.3d at 1161. Appellants as-
serted that the waiver request was unripe because Murdoch did not have a binding
commitment to buy the Post. Id. Appellants also argued that because there was no
actual finished deal, the FCC did not possess all of the facts necessary to reach an
informed decision. Id.
108. Id. While Article III of the Constitution requires a case or controversy
before federal courts can decide an issue, agencies may issue declaratory orders to
"terminate a controversy or remove uncertainty." Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 554(e)
(1988)). See Chavez v. Director, Office of Workers Compensation Programs, 961
F.2d 1409, 1414 (9th Cir. 1992) (ripeness doctrine limitation on federal judicial
power under Article III of Constitution does not apply to administrative agencies).
109. Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches, 46 F.3d at 1161-62. The court
found that the FCC could defer to the bankruptcy court's role in judging whether
bids for the Post were fair. Id. at 1162. Thus, the FCC could limit its inquiry to
whether, in the event Murdoch was the successful bidder, a permanent waiver was
in the public interest. Id. In justifying this finding, the court reasoned that the
bankruptcy court, in its efforts to dispose of the Post, could utilize safeguards to
protect against manipulation of the sales process. Id. The court concluded that
the Commission was not required to order further hearings on the details of Mur-
doch's bid for the Post. Id.
110. Id. at 1164. The court stated that judicial review of a commission mem-
ber's decision not to recuse himself was based on a "deferential, abuse of discre-
tion standard." Id. (citing Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Transp.,
899 F.2d 1230, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
111. Id. See Cinderella Career and Finishing Sch., Inc., v. FTC, 425 F.2d 583,
590-91 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (agency chairman should have recused himself in light of
public statement showing possible prejudgment of case).
112. Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches, 46 F.3d at 1164. The court ruled
that it would overturn a commissioner's choice not to recuse himself only in situa-
tions where the commissioner had "demonstrably made up [his] mind about im-
1996]
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The fourth and most significant issue on appeal addressed the
propriety of FCC's grant of a permanent waiver to Fox.' 13 The
court first outlined appellants' arguments opposing the waiver.' 14
First, appellants stated that the FCC failed to explain why it deviated
from precedent by granting a permanent rather than a temporary
waiver.' 1 5 Appellants also alleged that Fox failed to meet the heavy
burden of proof necessary to justify the granting of a permanent
waiver." 6 Appellants stated that the permanent waiver not only
"eviscerat[ed]" the long-standing cross-ownership rule, but also vio-
lated congressional intent that no federal funds be used to repeal
or reexamine the rule. 117 Finally, appellants contended that the
FCC's decision was arbitrary and capricious because it did not con-
sider appellants' expert testimony that the New York market is non-
competitive in its service of minority audiences. 1 8
In response, the FCC stated that granting the waiver accommo-
dated federal banking policies without frustrating the cross-owner-
ship rule's goals of promoting competition and diversity.1 9 The
portant and specific factual questions and [is] impervious to contrary evidence."
Id. at 1164-65 (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189,
1209 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981)). The court found that no
such situation existed in this case. Id. at 1165.
113. Id. at 1162.
114. Id. at 1161-62.
115. Id. at 1162. Appellants conceded that under Greater Boston Television
Corp. an agency's view of what is in the public interest may change. Id. (citing
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970)). Ap-
pellants asserted, however, that if an agency changes its course it must supply a
reasoned analysis showing that prior policies are being deliberately changed as
opposed to casually ignored. Id. (citing Greater Boston Television Corp., 444 F.2d at
852).
116. Id. Appellants asserted that Fox had not met the requisite yet undefined
"heavy" burden of proof necessary for a grant of a permanent waiver. Id. (citing
News Am. Publishing, Inc. v. FCC, 844 F.2d 800, 803 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Health
and Medicine Policy Research Group v. FCC, 807 F.2d 1038, 1042-43 (D.C. Cir
1986)), Appellants claimed that Fox had to demonstrate that the permanent
waiver was necessary and not merely beneficial to the Post's continued existence.
Id. Appellants argued that Fox could not have met its "heavy" burden because Fox
had failed to submit evidence that the permanent waiver was necessary. Id.
117. Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches, 46 F.3d at 1162 (citing Pub. L.
No. 102-395, 106 Stat. 11846 (1992)).
118. Id. Appellants urged the court to determine whether the agency prop-
erly considered all of the relevant factors. Id. (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971); Weyburn Broadcasting Ltd. Partner-
ship v. FCC, 984 F.2d 1220, 1227-28 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
119. Id. at 1162-63. The FCC argued that it should support the most benefi-
cial sale of a bankrupt entity's assets if doing so would not unduly interfere with
the Commission's obligation to ensure that licenses are used and transferred in
accordance with the Communications Act. Id. (citing Telemundo v. FCC, 802 F.2d
513, 518 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
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Commission reasoned that permanent, rather than temporary,
waiver was appropriate based on the business reasons offered by
Fox. 120 The FCC noted that Murdoch could not be expected to
sustain significant operating losses and undertake the substantial
financial commitment necessary to revitalize the Post without pos-
sessing the knowledge that he would not ultimately be required to
sell either the newspaper or the television station.' 2 ' Further, the
FCC determined that a permanent waiver would not significantly
impact the diversity and competition concerns central to the cross-
ownership rule. 122
The court found that, despite appellants' assertions to the con-
trary, no clear evidence existed that the FCC actually "changed
course" when it granted Fox a permanent waiver.' 23 Since the
rule's inception, the Commission specifically contemplated the pos-
sibility of granting permanent waivers in cases where strict applica-
tion of the rule would not advance the goal of media diversity.' 24
The grant of the waiver, therefore, was merely a valid continuation
of an established Commission policy. 125
Although previously the Commission granted permanent waiv-
ers only in cases involving preservation of existing ownership pat-
terns, the court noted that this did not eliminate the possibility of
120. Id. at 1163. Fox argued that a permanent waiver was imperative to its
long term strategy for reviving the Post. Id. Fox stated that without a permanent
waiver it could not conclude meaningful negotiations with the Post's labor unions,
suppliers, distributors, creditors and advertisers. Id.
121. Id. The FCC argued that granting a temporary waiver would have been
"meaningless" because such a waiver would not have satisfied the necessity of find-
ing a viable bidder for the paper. Id. With only a temporary waiver, Murdoch
would not have pursued his bid for the Post and the bankruptcy court may have
been without viable offers. Id. According to the Commission, granting the perma-
nent waiver benefitted the debtor, the creditors and the bankruptcy court by re-
moving uncertainty regarding the viability of the primary bidder. Id.
122. Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches, 46 F.3d at 1163. The FCC noted
that it lacked authority to decide on any applications based on the possible content
of a newspaper. Id. The Commission also stated that the record did not support
appellants' view of the New York market. Id. The Commission found that the New
York media market possessed attributes making it uniquely competitive, and that
the Post and Murdoch's television stations controlled a very small share of the audi-
ence and advertising in the market. Id.
123. Id. The FCC had always provided for waiver of the cross-ownership ban
in exceptional circumstances. Id. (citing FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for
Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 786 n.9 (1978); Health and Medicine Policy Research
Group v. FCC, 807 F.2d 1038, 1041 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
124. Id. (citing News America Publishing, Inc. v. FCC, 844 F.2d 800, 803 (D.C.
Cir. 1988); Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046, 1076 n.24 (1975)). For
the full text of the waiver policy, see supra note 66.
125. Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches, 46 F.3d at 1163.
1996]
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granting permanent waivers in extraordinary circumstances.126
Further, the court reasoned that because the Commission had his-
torically retained the authority to grant waivers under extraordinary
circumstances, the grant of a permanent waiver did not violate the
congressional ban on FCC repeal or reexamination of the cross-
ownership rule. 127
The court determined that, based on the evidence submitted
by Fox, the Commission had a reasonable basis to warrant a perma-
nent waiver. 28 The court considered the detailed explanation pro-
vided by the FCC and accepted the Commission's conclusions that
Fox had met the heavy burden required for a permanent waiver.' 29
Moreover, the court found that such a waiver best served the public
interest and was entitled to "substantial judicial deference."130
The court acknowledged, however, that the speculative nature
of determining the course of future public interest required deduc-
tions based on the specific and expert knowledge and experience
of the FCC.131 Consequently, the court determined that absolute
factual support in the record for the Commission's judgment or
prediction was neither necessary nor requisite. 32 The court also
agreed with the Commission's finding that appellants' arguments
concerning the editorial content of a newspaper should be disre-
garded because the cross-ownership rule could not lawfully be
based on a party's political, economic or social views.' 3 3 The court
thus upheld the FCC's decision, finding that the Commission's
126. Id. (citing Field Communications Corp., 65 F.C.C.2d 959 (1977). In Field
Communication Corp., the Commission allowed for a permanent waiver of the cross-
ownership rule in a situation where the transaction in question did not actually
create a new ownership pattern. Field Communications Corp., 65 F.C.C.2d at 959.
At the same time, the Commission noted that permanent waivers could be granted
based on the exigencies of the circumstances involved. Id. For a full discussion of
Field Communications Corp., see supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
127. Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches, 46 F.3d at 1163. For the text of
the original congressional ban on the reexamination or repeal of the cross-owner-
ship ban, see supra note 87.
128. Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches, 46 F.3d at 1163-64. The court
found that Fox's evidence about the necessity of establishing a long-term business
plan for the Post was sufficient. Id. at 1164.
129. Id.
130. Id. (citing Health and Medicine Policy Research Group v. FCC, 807 F.2d
1038, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). According to the court, the fact that Murdoch previ-
ously had a temporary two-year waiver, and that the Post floundered when he
divested it, gave additional support to the FCC's conclusion that a temporary
waiver was not adequate. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. (citing FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S.
775, 814 (1978)).
133. Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches, 46 F.3d at 1164.
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grant of a permanent waiver to Fox was sufficiently supported by
the record and not arbitrary or capricious.13 4
V. CRITIcAL ANALYSIS
By affirming the FCC's grant of the permanent waiver to Fox,
the D.C. Circuit in Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches v. FCC
has, in effect, allowed both the Commission and the publisher/
broadcaster to contravene the will and intent of Congress. The
court found that the FCC had contemplated waivers in extraordi-
nary circumstances since the rule's adoption and, thus, the Com-
mission's determination that circumstances exist to warrant a
waiver does not violate Congress' ban on repealing or re-examining
the rule. 13 5 Furthermore, although permanent waivers had previ-
ously been contemplated, they had neither been contemplated nor
granted in circumstances such as those surrounding Fox's intended
purchase of the Post.136 By granting the waiver to Fox, the FCC has
permanently repealed the rule with respect to Fox's ownership of
the Post.13 7 This result is contrary to the congressional intent that
no funds appropriated by Congress be used to repeal, change or re-
examine the cross-ownership ban.13 8
In Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit ac-
knowledged that the FCC could establish policies based on what it
deemed to be in the public interest.13 9 The court stated that its
function in reviewing such policy decisions is to assure that the
agency gives reasoned consideration to all material facts and is-
sues.1 40 While the Commission can alter its view of what is in the
public interest, when making such a change, it is required to supply
134. Id. at 1166.
135. Id. at 1163.
136. For discussion of circumstances warranting permanent waiver, see supra
note 66. For full discussion of the only other grant of a permanent waiver, see
supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
137. The significance of the waiver granted to Fox is that it is permanent in
nature and thus not subject to reconsideration. Thus, the policy considerations
underlying a cross-ownership ban would permanently be circumvented by Fox's
ownership of the Post.
138. Pub. L. No. 102-395, 106 Stat. 11846 (1992).
139. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir.
1970). For full discussion of Greater Boston Television Corp., see supra notes 59-62
and accompanying text.
140. Greater Boston Television Corp., 444 F.2d at 851.
1996] 635
23
Schadl: Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches v. FCC: Isolated Instance
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
636 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAw JouRNAL [Vol. III: p. 613
a reasoned analysis indicating that prior policies are changed inten-
tionally and deliberately and not just casually ignored.14'
In Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches, the D.C. Circuit
found that the FCC did not actually change course by granting a
permanent waiver to Fox.142 The court stated that the FCC contem-
plated granting such waivers in situations where strict application of
the rule would defeat the rule's stated purpose of promoting
diversity. 143
The court acknowledged, however, that permanent waivers
had only been granted in situations preserving existing ownership
patterns.'4 Previously, when Fox approached the FCC about waiv-
ers, it requested and was granted temporary waivers only.' 45 This
grant of a permanent waiver, at least with regard to Fox, was a
"change in course" for the FCC. Further, while the FCC had ini-
tially provided for the grant of permanent waivers, 1' only one such
permanent waiver was granted during the eighteen years of the
rule's existence, in a case involving "highly unusual facts."' 47 The
Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches case does not seem "highly
141. Id. at 852. The Commission could not adopt a course that is arbitrary or
unreasonable, but the Commission need not always continuously follow a course
just because it has been in effect for a significant time. Id. at 859-60.
142. Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches v. FCC, 46 F.3d 1154, 1163
(D.C. Cir. 1995). The FCC had always provided for waivers of the cross-ownership
rule, both temporary and permanent, in exceptional circumstances. Id. (citing
Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046, 1076 n.24, 1085 (1975)).
143. Id. For the list of circumstances under which a waiver to the cross-owner-
ship ban can be granted, see supra note 66.
144. Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches, 46 F.3d at 1163. Only once, "in a
case involving 'highly unusual facts,' had the Commission actually granted a per-
manent waiver of the cross-ownership rule." News Am. Publishing, Inc. v. FCC, 844
F.2d 800, 803 n.4. (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing Field Communications Corp., 65
F.C.C.2d 959 (1977)). The court in Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches con-
cluded that although a waiver had been granted in a single, factually distinguish-
able case, this did not rule out the possibility of granting permanent waivers in
other extraordinary circumstances. Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches, 46 F.3d
at 1163. For full discussion of Field Communications Corp., see supra notes 82-86 and
accompanying text.
145. News Am. Publishing Inc., 844 F.2d at 804. In 1985 and 1986 Fox owned
the New York Post and the Boston Herald. Id. During these years Fox obtained FCC
broadcast licenses for WNYW-TV in New York and WXNE-TV in Boston, and the
Commission granted temporary waivers of the cross-ownership rule. Id. The Com-
mission granted a two year waiver for the New York cross-ownership and an 18
month waiver for the Boston cross-ownership. Id. (citing Metromedia Radio and
Television, Inc., 102 F.C.C.2d at 1353).
146. Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046, 1076 n.24 (1975).
147. News Am. Publishing Inc., 844 F.2d at 803. In considering the validity of
Pub. L. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329, News America Publishing Inc. generally discussed
the waiver process. Id. The court cited Field Communications Corp., which was the
only petition for permanent waiver granted by the Commission, as a case with
"highly unusual facts." Id. This grant of waiver preserved an already existing news-
24
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unusual." Previously, the Commission granted Fox a waiver in cir-
cumstances very similar to those in this case. 148 If the court had
looked at the history of the rule and the history of this case instead
of only examining the regulation in which the ban was delineated,
the court may well have concluded that the grant of a permanent
waiver to Fox represents a deviation from the course the FCC had
been maintaining. 149 Greater Boston Television Corporation requires
the FCC to provide a more clearly reasoned analysis showing that
the rule was not just being casually ignored. 50
Soon after the FCC promulgated the cross-ownership ban, the
very validity of the ban was challenged as too restrictive and over-
reaching.151 In FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting,
the Supreme Court validated the cross-ownership ban. 152 The
Court upheld the Commission's finding that such a ban would best
serve the public interest by achieving greater diversity of view-
points.' 5  The Court accepted the Commission's reasoning that the
rule served the public interest and the First Amendment by assur-
ing "the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse
and antagonistic sources." 154
In this case, the FCC determined, and the D.C. Circuit agreed,
that a permanent waiver served the public interest.1 55 The FCC and
the court found that such a waiver was necessary to revitalize the
Post and to help the debtor, the creditors and the bankruptcy
court.1 56 While these considerations are important to the public
interest, they should not overrule the diversity interests grounded
paper/broadcast combination. Field Communications Corp., 65 F.C.C.2d 959
(1977).
148. For discussion of this temporary waiver, see supra notes 23-25 and accom-
panying text.
149. For discussion of the development of the cross-ownership ban, see supra
notes 55-66 and accompanying text. For discussion of Fox's prior dealings with
the FCC regarding waiver of the cross-ownership ban, see supra notes 73-81 and
accompanying text.
150. For full discussion of Greater Boston Television Corp., see supra notes 59-62
and accompanying text.
151. See FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 789
(1978).
152. Id. at 792. For a full discussion of National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting,
see supra, notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
153. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. at 796. The Court found
that by promulgating the cross-ownership ban, the Commission had not used un-
reasonable means to reach its goal. Id.
154. Id. at 785 (citing Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046, 1048
(1975) (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945))).




Schadl: Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches v. FCC: Isolated Instance
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
638 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
in the First Amendment.157 By upholding the permanent waiver in
this case, and thereby precluding future consideration of the mat-
ter with respect to Fox and the Post, the court has allowed the FCC
to place financial public interest above the First Amendment public
interest that the ban was originally intended to serve. In Metropoli-
tan Council of NAACP Branches, the financial public interest was dis-
cussed in terms of the "business reasons Fox offered showing that
permanent waiver was necessary to its long-term strategy for reviv-
ing the Post."158 The court also acknowledged the financial com-
mitment required of Murdoch and the convenience of permanent
waiver for the Post, Murdoch and the bankruptcy court.159 While
these reasons are not frivolous, they should not supersede the valu-
able First Amendment interests in promoting marketplace diversity
through diverse voices on which the rule was based in the first
place.
The D.C. Circuit upheld the validity of waivers of the cross-
ownership ban granted to serve the public interest in Health and
Medicine Policy Research Group v. FCC.160 The court found that fac-
tual determinations made by the Commission regarding waivers
were of a judgmental and predictive nature.' 6 ' Therefore, the
court's review of such determinations was limited to finding
whether the determinations were "arbitrary and capricious."162 The
court further found that the Commission's judgment regarding
how to serve the public interest deserved substantial judicial defer-
ence. 63 Finally, the court determined that in spite of the "scant"
157. In National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, the FCC initially stated that
First Amendment interests provided for the "widest possible dissemination of in-
formation from diverse and antagonistic viewpoints." National Citizens Comm. for
Broadcasting, 436 U.S. at 785 (citing Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d at
1049). The underlying principle was that increased diversification of ownership
more than likely would result in enhanced diversity of viewpoints. Id. at 786 (citing
Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d at 1076).
158. Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches, 46 F.3d at 1163.
159. Id.
160. 807 F.2d 1038, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1986). This case involved a prior tempo-
rary cross-ownership ban waiver request by Murdoch. Id. at 1040. For full discus-
sion of this case see supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
161. Health and Medicine Policy Research Group, 807 F.2d at 1043. When the
Commission makes such determinations, they do not require complete factual sup-
port in the record. Id. (quoting National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. at
814).
162. Id. (citing Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982)).
163. Id. The court found that "the scope of review is particularly limited
when the FCC engages in 'the process of drawing lines, of making judgmental
decisions.' " Id. (citations omitted).
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amount of evidence, it was sufficient to support the FCC's determi-
nation that a waiver was appropriate.16 4
In Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches, the court again gave
considerable deference to the Commission's factual and evidentiary
findings.165 The court mentioned the heavier burden of proof re-
quired for a grant of a permanent waiver, but neither the FCC nor
the courts have established the criteria required to satisfy this heav-
ier burden.166 Thus, while the Commission's evidentiary findings
receive substantial deference, the court should have attempted to
define the heavy burden, and determine whether Fox had actually
met the burden required for permanent waiver as opposed to the
burden required for mere temporary waivers.
In News America Publishing Inc. v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit struck
down a portion of legislation which prohibited the extension of ex-
isting temporary waivers of the cross-ownership ban.1 67 As dis-
cussed above, Judge Robinson dissented, finding that Congress was
rationally responding to what it perceived as a threat to the cross-
ownership ban. 68 Judge Robinson's concerns about the Commis-
164. Id. at 1044. The court found that it could make such a finding because
of the comparatively lenient evidentiary standard required for temporary waivers
and the substantial degree of deference owed by the judiciary to the Commission
in such instances. Id. at 1044-45.
165. Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches, 46 F.3d at 1163-64. The court
stated that the FCC could have reasonably found that the evidence Fox submitted
was sufficient. Id. at 1164.
166. Id. at 1163. The court stated "the burden on an applicant for a perma-
nent waiver is considerably heavier than for a temporary one." Id. n.1 (quoting
News Am. Publishing, Inc. v. FCC, 844 F.2d 800, 803 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). However,
News America Publishing Inc., cites Health and Medicine Policy Research Group for this
proposition. News Am. Publishing, Inc., 844 F.2d at 803 (citing Health and Medicine
Policy Research Group v. FCC, 807 F.2d 1038, 1042-43 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). The
Health and Medicine Policy Research Group court discusses two distinct evidentiary
standards. Health and Medicine Policy Research Group, 807 F.2d at 1042-43. However,
these standards are the burdens of proof for establishing inability to sell a station
as opposed to ability to sell a station only at an artificially depressed price. Id. The
court expressly stated that it was not contemplating permanent waivers because
such conditions (inability to sell or ability to sell only at an artificially depressed
price) were "not ... expected to endure indefinitely." Id. at 1042 (citing Second
Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046, 1085 n.46 (1975)).
167. News Am. Publishing, Inc., 844 F.2d at 815. The latter part of the provi-
sion, Pub. L. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329 (1987), was struck down as underinclusive
and unreasonable because it applied only to Murdoch. Id. The court did not re-
view the portion of the provision prohibiting the FCC from re-examining or re-
pealing the cross-ownership rule, finding that prohibition was not ripe for review.
Id. at 802 n.1. For full discussion of this case, see supra notes 87-92 and accompany-
ing text.
168. News Am. Publishing, Inc., 844 F.2d at 817 (Robinson, J., dissenting). For
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sion's erosion and possible abandon of the cross-ownership ban are
embodied by the grant of the permanent waiver. Such a waiver al-
lows for complete circumvention of congressional intent by the
Commission and the publisher/broadcaster.
Judge Robinson stated that over time, the FCC's position on
the rule had changed, and that the Commission had indicated it
might favor revision or outright repeal of the rule. 169 However, be-
cause of the congressional ban on the use of appropriated funds to
re-examine or repeal the cross-ownership ban, the Commission may
not effectuate any revision or elimination of the rule.17 0
According to Judge Robinson, by enacting the ban on re-exam-
ination and repeal of the cross-ownership rule, Congress was react-
ing to what it perceived as the threatened erosion and possible
eradication of the cross-ownership ban.1 7 ' Members of Congress
desired to preserve the integrity of the cross-ownership rules, and
were concerned about abuse of the waiver process. 172 Judge Robin-
son stated that the retreat from the rule justified congressional
fears that the FCC would unjustifiably grant a waiver to News
America.' 7 3
169. News Am. Publishing, Inc., 844 F.2d at 816 (Robinson,J., dissenting). The
Commission practically admitted this in its brief, stating:
[t] his is not to say that, in the Commission's view, continuing the ban on
newspaper/television cross-ownership for another year is necessarily
good public policy. Indeed, had Congress not provided otherwise, the
Commission might have concluded that the present rule against newspa-
per/television cross-ownership should have been reviewed to determine
whether it continued to serve the public interest.
Id. at 816 n.9 (Robinson, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for Appellee at 16).
170. Pub. L. 102-395, 106 Stat. 11846 (1992).
171. News Am. Publishing, Inc., 844 F.2d at 817 (Robinson, J., dissenting). Ac-
cording to Judge Robinson, Congress was concerned with the possibility that
through indefinite or successive extensions of a temporary waiver, the Commission
could grant the equivalent of a permanent waiver without meeting the heavy bur-
den required. Id. (Robinson, J., dissenting). Exemplifying congressional concern
with the Commission's lowered support of the cross-ownership ban, Senator Ken-
nedy stated, "our unsatisfactory experience with the FCC ... [makes the cross-
ownership ban's] emphasis on diversity... more important than ever." Devins,
supra note 6, at 167 (citing 134 CONG. REc. S143 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1988) (state-
ment of Sen. Kennedy)).
172. News Am. Publishing Inc., 844 F.2d at 818 (Robinson, J., dissenting).
Judge Robinson noted a letter from the House Subcommittee on Telecommunica-
tions, Consumer Protection, and Finance to the FCC, in which the Subcommittee
reemphasized its position: "[W] e firmly believe that the cross ownership rules are
vitally important in protecting competition and diversity in the market place of
ideas and that waivers to those rules should be viewed as an extraordinary, not
ordinary, action." Id. (Robinson, J., dissenting) (quoting Letter from House of Repre-
sentatives Subcomm. on Telecommunications to Mark S. Fowler, supra note 14).
173. Id. at 819 (Robinson, J., dissenting). Judge Robinson cited Senator Hol-
lings, who said: "[W]e have, time and again, set forth admonitions and the FCC
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In upholding the FCC's grant of a permanent waiver to the
cross-ownership rule, the court gave substantial deference to the
findings of the Commission. 174 Without any meaningful discussion,
the court accepted each of the FCC's arguments. 175 The court af-
firmed the FCC determination that Fox had met the "heavy" bur-
den required for the grant of a permanent waiver without defining
this key term.1 76 As a result, the court has created a precedent that
the FCC can, contrary to the will of Congress, affect the de facto
elimination of the ban on cross-ownership of newspapers and televi-
sion stations within a single media market.
VI. IMPACT
Congress recognized the FCC's movement toward repealing
the cross-ownership rules and attempted to strengthen the ban's
existence by enacting legislation. 177 Congress clearly established its
intent that the cross-ownership ban continue to serve its original
diversification goals even if the Commission no longer favored the
rule.
The D.C. Circuit's decision in Metropolitan Council of NAACP
Branches v. FCC allows the Commission to circumvent Congress' de-
sire for diversification of viewpoints. This holding allows the FCC
to justify a permanent waiver based on fairly minimal showings.
While the court acknowledged that a "heavy" burden must be
met,1 78 it does not define this burden and in essence accepts the
FCC's argument that a permanent waiver may be granted without a
showing that more than a temporary waiver is warranted. 179 This
case may therefore sound the death knell for the cross-ownership
ban. While the rule will continue in effect, the Commission and a
has in turn done exactly the opposite.... I am trying to catch a runaway Federal
Communications Commission. They have been the ones who have been edging to
not just another waiver but permanent repeal." Id. (Robinson, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing 134 CONG. Rc. S56-$57 (daily ed.Jan. 26, 1988) (statement of Sen. Hollings)).
174. Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches, 46 F.3d at 1164.
175. Id. at 1162-64.
176. Id. at 1163.
177. Devins, supra note 6, at 166-67. In 1987, Congress passed Pub. L. No.
100-202, 101 Stat. 1329 (1987). For the text of this provision, see supra note 87.
The D.C. Circuit found the last 18 words of this provision invalid in News America
Publishing, Inc. v. FCC. For a full discussion of News America Publishing, Inc., see
supra notes 87-92. In 1992, Congress passed Pub. L. No. 102-395, 106 Stat. 11846
(1992), continuing the proscription of using appropriated funds to re-examine or
repeal the cross-ownership ban.
178. Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches v. FCC, 46 F.3d 1154, 1163
(D.C. Cir. 1995).
179. Id. at 1162-64.
19961
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publisher/broadcaster such as Rupert Murdoch now have a
blueprint for sidestepping the ban and Congress' wishes.
The Commission, an "arm of Congress," has successfully
molded the permanent waiver into a tool for circumventing and
frustrating congressional desire to promote viewpoint diversity
through the cross-ownership ban. A publisher/broadcaster can ap-
ply to the FCC for a permanent waiver making a less than signifi-
cant showing of need. Fox and Murdoch may, in fact, have satisfied
one of the criteria for a waiver. 180 However, a finding that circum-
stances warrant temporary waiver should not allow the FCC to evis-
cerate the cross-ownership ban by casting aside its long standing
policy of granting temporary waivers and instead granting a perma-
nent waiver. Already disfavoring the ban, the Commission can now
find that the "heavy" burden necessary for a permanent waiver has
been satisfied. Because of the substantial deference given to the
Commission in Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches v. FCC, the
FCC may grant these waivers without significant concern that the
grant will be reversed by the judiciary.
Perhaps, however, a re-examination of the cross-ownership rule
is in order. At the time of News America Publishing, Inc. v. FCC, the
Commission stated that increases in the number of media outlets
available in a given market would provide the Commission with a
good reason to re-evaluate whether the cross-ownership rule contin-
ued to be necessary to further the public interest.181 Current argu-
ments urge that viewpoint diversity in media markets is now the
norm, not the exception, and thus no longer needs protection. 182
Opponents to the cross-ownership ban argue that although the rule
may have been an appropriate response to the conditions existing
when it was promulgated, it did not account for inevitable techno-
logical advances.183 Because the diversity rationale may no longer
have support in the telecommunications market conditions that ex-
180. For the list of the four situations in which the grant of a waiver is appro-
priate, see supra note 66.
181. Devins, supra note 6, at 168 n.135 (citing Corrected Brief for the FCC at
21 n.6, News Am. Publishing, Inc. v. FCC, 844 F.2d 800 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
182. Emord, supra note 11, at 445. Significant expansion of the range and
depth of viewing and listening options, along with substantially open entry into
new electronic media markets is the trend in the communications industry. Id.
Thus, the original fears of economic and viewpoint monopolization that underlie
the cross-ownership ban are not likely to materialize. Id.
183. Hoffman, supra note 2, at 347. The Commission's desire to allow more
voices into the marketplace is no longer a concern because "[t]oday's telecommu-
nications market offers individuals a plethora of information outlets to which they
have access on a daily basis." Id. (citing In re Syracuse Peace Council, 63 R.R.2d
541, 577 (1987)).
[Vol. III: p. 613
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ist today, the cross-ownership rule potentially infringes upon free-
dom of expression by limiting the opportunities a publisher/
broadcaster has to supply additional media in large market areas. 184
The ban, for all intents and purposes, will no longer be effec-
tive unless an anti-cross-ownership Congress can enact new legisla-
tion to buttress the ban and mitigate the effects of Metropolitan
Council of NAACP Branches v. FCC. Current technology has, how-
ever, eliminated some of the concerns for protecting market diver-
sity.' 85 The cross-ownership ban certainly served the public interest
at the time of its promulgation. However, Congress should recog-
nize that the rule is both ineffective, especially after Metropolitan
Council of NAACP Branches v. FCC, and unnecessary due to advances
in technology. Congress should realize that the cross-ownership
ban no longer serves the public interest and should eliminate legis-
lative restrictions on the FCC to allow the Commission to effect a de
jure repeal of the ban to match the de facto repeal already in place.
John E. Schadl
184. Id. at 350-51.
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